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RIEB, Kobe University Site Map Access 日本語 Home Research & Education Publications RIEB Discussion Paper Series (English) RIEB Discussion Paper Series No.2011-21 RIEB Discussion Paper Series No.2011-21 Title On Coalitional Stability and Single-peakedness Abstract We study a one-dimensional voting game in which voters choose a policy from a one-dimensional policy set over which voters have single-peaked preferences. The purpose of this paper is to analyze coalitional behaviors under any given voting mechanism. We employ the notion of strong Nash equilibrium and identify a necessary and sufficient condition for a voting mechanism to possess a strong Nash equilibrium by using the minimax theorem. We moreover show that any strong Nash outcome, if it exists, results in an outcome recommended by a particular augmented median voter rule. Keywords Single-peakedness, Augmented median voter rule, Strong Nash equilibrium, Coalition-proof Nash Equilibrium, Minimax theorem, Manipulation. JEL Classification D78, D72, C70. Inquiries Hirofumi YAMAMURA RIEB, Kobe University Rokkodai-cho, Nada-ku, Kobe 657-8501 Japan Phone: +81-78-803-7036 FAX: +81-78-803-7059 About RIEB Faculty Seminars at RIEB Research & Education Sections Kobe University Site Policy Site Map Access Contact Us Copyright©1996-2018 Research Institute for Economics and Business Administration, Kobe University. All Rights Reserved.